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Neither force nor will, but merely judgment*. 
Riassunto. La crisi costituzionale in Polonia. Dal court packing plan al rifiuto 
della pubblicazione delle sentenze del Tribunale Costituzionale. Lo presente studio 
affronta il tema della crisi costituzionale che la Polonia sta attraversando. Fin dal suo 
inizio, il Tribunale Costituzionale gode dei più alti livelli di fiducia sociale. Nonostan-
te le crtiche o le controversie che talvolta sono emerse su alcuni giudizi, fino all’anno 
scorso il Tribunale non è stato mai oggetto di attacchi politici diretti. La crisi, provocata 
dal conflitto sulla sua composizione, avvenuta anche negli altri ordinamenti sotto forma 
del court packing plan, evolve verso una situazione in cui tutte le sue attività vengano 
compromesse. L’attuale governo polacco nega validità alle decisioni del Tribunale e ha 
rifiutato di pubblicarne alcune. Istituzioni internazionali, tra cui il Consiglio d’Europa 
e l’Unione europea, hanno sollevato gravi obiezioni in proposito.
Parola chiave: La crisi costituzionale in Polonia; Tribunale Costituzionale; Venice 
Commission.
Streszczenie. Kryzys konstytucyjny w Polsce. Od planu upakowania sądu (co-
urt-packing) do negowania orzeczeń Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Niniejszy artykuł 
dotyczy kryzysu konstytucyjnego wokół Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w Polsce. Trybunał 
* Alexander hamilton made this claim in federalist #78. Amongst the others, he stated: 
“It may truly be said to have neither fORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment”.
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Konstytucyjny był od początku swojego istnienia uznawany za organ cieszący się jed-
nym z wyższych wskaźników zaufania społecznego. Mimo kontrowersyjności niektó-
rych orzeczeń i krytyki kierowanej pod ich adresem, nigdy, do ostatniego roku, TK nie 
był się obiektem bezpośredniego politycznego ataku. Trwający spór polityczny wokół 
Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, choć pierwotnie dotyczący znanego innym systemom po-
mysłu obsadzenia sądu „swoimi sędziami” (court packing plan), ewoluuje w kierunku 
próby pełnego sparaliżowania prac tego organu. Obecny rząd i większość parlamentarna 
negują ważność orzeczeń TK i odmawiają części z nich publikacji. Budzi to poważne 
zastrzeżenia ze strony podmiotów międzynarodowych, w tym Rady Europy oraz Unii 
Europejskiej. 
Słowa kluczowe: krysys konstytucyjny w Polsce; Trybunał Konstytucyjny; Komi-
sja Wenecka.
1. INTRODUCTION
The history of the Polish Constitutional Court (Trybunał Konstytucyjny, 
hereinafter: the CC) shows that it has been one of the most respected constitu-
tional organs. Although the CC has ruled on many controversial cases, and its 
case-law sometimes has been heavily criticized, until 2015, it had never become 
the object of a direct political attack1. 
The ongoing constitutional crisis in Poland started a few months after the 
new Constitutional Court Act of 25th june 2015 (hereinafter: the CCA of 2015) 
had come into force. The CCA of 2015 replaced the previous Constitutional 
Court Act of 1997 (the CCA of 1997). The draft of the new Act (CCA of 2015) 
was presented by the former President, Bronisław Komorowski, already in 2013. 
yet, the parliamentary proceeding on the draft came to a  standstill until May 
20152. On 25th of june Sejm adopted the CAA of 2015. It was signed by the out-
going President Komorowski3 on one of his last days in office and soon thereafter 
1 A. śledzińska-Simon,  available at: Midnight Judges: Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal 
Caught Between Political Fronts, VerfBlog, 2015/11/23, http://verfassungsblog.de/midnight-judg-
es-polands-constitutional-tribunal-caught-between-political-fronts/. 
2 On 29th of August 2013 the President submitted a draft Act on the CC to Sejm. The ratio-
nale for the draft act was developed by a team (composed, among the others, of former CC judges) 
headed by the President of the CC. On 3rd of October 2014 Sejm initiated works on the draft Act on 
the CC. On 1st of April 2015 the Extraordinary Subcommittee on the draft Act on the Constitutional 
Court started to work on the draft. On 9th of April 2015 the report of the Extraordinary Subcommit-
tee was submitted by the President to Sejm.
3 On 10th of May 2015 the first round of presidential elections was held. Andrzej Duda ob-
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became binding law. Promulgated on 30th of july 2015 it entered in force 30 days 
later, on 30th of August 2015).
2. “OCTOBER jUDGES”
The CAA of 2015 aimed to introduce more coherent rules of the procedure 
before the CC (above all the possibility to pronounce a judgment without a pub-
lic hearing4), as well as specify the status of judges, and the selection procedure5. 
however, most of the provisions included in the draft concerning the reform of 
the selection procedure by participation of other actors (than Sejm) in it, such 
as representatives of legal processions, or universities, had been dropped. As 
a result, the appointment of judges of the CC remained exclusively in the hands 
of the majority in Sejm6. 
During the parliamentary proceeding on the draft a transition provision was 
introduced, which allowed the governing coalition (composed of Platforma Oby-
watelska, hereinafter: PO and Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, hereinafter: PSL) to 
appoint five CC judges on 8th of October 2015, shortly before the oncoming 
parliamentary elections that PO was likely to lose7. According to the new Act, 
the motion for the appointment of a judge in 2015 should be presented not later 
tained 34.76% of votes, while Bronisław Komorowski 33.77%. Two weeks later, in the second 
round of elections Andrzej Duda obtained 51.55% of votes and won the elections.
4 The ACC of 2015 permitted the CC to adjudicate at a sitting in camera (without a public 
hearing) in the two following situations: when written statements of participants in proceedings 
as well as the other evidence gathered with regard to a case constitute a sufficient basis for issuing 
a ruling; or when a case concerns a legal matter that has been sufficiently examined in previous 
rulings of the CC. 
5 As stated in the draft’s rationale, “the need to develop and adopt a new act on the Consti-
tutional Tribunal derives from the following causes: […] the need to create organisational condi-
tions serving effective judicial decision making, the need to specify the criteria for election of 
Constitutional Tribunal judges as well as to establish a transparent procedure for selecting a pool 
of candidates out of which groups of MPs and the Presidium of the Sejm could submit candidates 
for judges”. Rationale for draft act (Sejm’s publication no. 1590), available at: http://www.sejm.
gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=1590.
6 A. śledzińska-Simon, op. cit.
7 On 12th of May 2015, during the works of the Sejm’s committee, a transitional provision 
135 was proposed (in the published text of the CAA of 2015 this was Article 137) which set 
a deadline for submitting candidates for five judges of the CC replacing the judges whose tenures 
were to end in 2015.
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than 3 months after the CCA of 2015 entered into force, while the general rule 
introduced by this law was that such motion should be presented not later than 3 
months before the expiration of the term in office.
Three out of five new-appointed judges replaced the judges whose nine-
year terms had expired, while two were supposed to replace the judges whose 
terms were going to expire soon after the parliamentary election ordered by the 
President on 25th of October 20158. The ratio legis of the introduced provision 
was to prevent 3 seats in the CC from remaining vacant until the new Parliament 
commenced its work9. Several provisions of the CCA of 2015 were challenged 
at the CC by the group of the then opposition party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 
(hereinafter: PiS) deputes, but the application was withdrawn shortly after win-
ning in the parliamentary elections10. The idea behind soon became apparent: 
instead of resorting to a  judicial remedy, the new majority party decided to 
remould the law to their own needs by the tools they currently had at hand: 
the legislative process11. One week later, PO, which now switched sides with 
PiS and moved to the opposition bench, put forward a  motion to the CC to 
scrutinise the constitutionality of the Act, before PiS would have a chance to 
change it. It was an opportunistically-driven smart move if considering that the 
now opposition party, PO,challenged the law pushed through by PO, then the 
ruling party12.
According to the Constitution of 1997 the CC judges are appointed by Sejm. 
yet, both the CCA of 1997 and the CCA of 2015 provided for that it was the 
competence of the President to swear in the CC judges. Until 2015 the President 
had never delayed taking the oath from the CC judges appointed by Sejm. Never-
theless, the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, uplifted a mere formality to a co-
determination mechanism without any constitutional basis therefore and refused 
to take the oath of office from all the five “October judges”. In consequence, 
8 The CC judges were appointed during the last sitting of Sejm on 8th October 2015, while 
the end of the term of the replaced judges fell on 6th November, 2nd December and 6th December 
respectively.
9 Pursuant to the Article the first sitting of the newly elected Parliament needs to be sum-
moned by the President within 30 days after elections.
10 Parliamentary elections were held on 25th of October 2015. The PiS Party obtained 37.58% 
of votes which translated into 235 (out of 460) seats in the Sejm.
11 A. Radwan, Chess-boxing around the rule of law – Polish constitutionalism at trial, 
Allerhand Institut Working Paper 13/2016, available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publica-
tion/292156728_Chess-boxing_around_the_rule_of_law_-_Polish_constitutionalism_at_trial, p. 9. 
12 Ibidem.
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three seats in the CC remained vacant. The newly selected judges got trapped in 
the procedural deadlock, and the pending replacement process got frozen13.
3. “DECEMBER jUDGES” 
On 25th of October, PiS party won an unprecedented absolute majority of 
seats in the Polish parliamentary elections. On 19th of November, shortly after 
the new Prime Minister Beata Szydło and her Cabinet had taken power, the new 
Sejm passed an amendment (the Amendment Act of 19th November 2015, herein-
after: the AA of 19th November 2015) to the existing CCA of 2015. The Amend-
ment, adopted in record time, stipulated a limited term of the President of the 
CC, vacated the current seats of the President of the CC and the Vice President 
of the CC, and provided that the selection of judges whose term expired in this 
year was to take place within 7 days after the law came into force. It also made 
the appointment conditional upon taking the oath before the President of the 
Republic. The amendment was passed by the new Sejm, in absence of the oppo-
sition parties, which had left the session in an act of protest, with tacit consent of 
Senate, which did not propose amendments or the motion for the rejection of the 
draft. The amendment was challenged by the Opposition at the CC14. 
On 25th of November 2015 Sejm adopted 5 resolutions to declare the inva-
lidity of the Sejm’s resolutions of 8th October 2015, which concerned the elec-
tion of the judges of the CC by Sejm during its previous parliamentary term 
(2011–2015)15. The publication of the latter resolutions in the Official Gazette 
completed the Sejm procedure for the election of five judges of the CC whose 
terms of office were to end on 6th of November, 2nd of December, and 8th of De-
cember 2015. In the explanatory note for the draft resolutions of Sejm, dated 
25th November 2015 (Sejm Papers Nos. 42, 43, 44, 45, 46/8th term of the Sejm), 
the authors explained, inter alia, that: 
“By determining […] the invalidity of resolutions on the election of persons 
to hold offices as judges of the Tribunal […], the Sejm did not dismiss the legally 
elected judges. firstly, it is inadmissible to dismiss legally elected judges of the 
Tribunal […]; secondly, dismissal from an office may not occur, where the office 
was not assumed by a given person due to the invalidity of the election process. 
13 Ibidem.
14 See: A. śledzińska-Simon, op. cit.
15 Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland –  Monitor Polski  (M.P.) items 1131, 1132, 
1133, 1134, and 1135; hereinafter: the Sejm’s resolutions of 25 November 2015.
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The Sejm is competent to evaluate its actions and eliminate the invalidity thereof. 
The Sejm’s determination of the invalidity of the indicated resolutions, which is 
under discussion here, constitutes an element of the aforementioned elimination 
of invalidity. Still, the said determination should not be regarded as tantamount 
to the repeal, annulment or revocation of the legally adopted resolutions and ef-
fects thereof. Determining the invalidity of resolutions is only a determination 
(evaluation) that the resolutions were adopted in breach of procedural provisions. 
[…] The consequence of such a determination is the opening up of a possibility 
of carrying out the election again”.
In the resolutions of 25th November 2015, Sejm also requested the President 
to refrain from giving the oath of office to the judges of the CC elected by the 
previous Sejm.
As a reaction to the Sejm’s resolutions of 25th November, on 30th of Novem-
ber the CC held in a full Court Sitting and issued an injunction ordering all pub-
lic authorities to abstain from any actions which might undermine the effective-
ness of the pending review of constitutionality of the Law. The injunction was 
preventive in nature, had the effect of final judgment and was binding to those to 
whom it was addressed. Its aim was to make sure that any future decision given 
in the case on merits by the CC would be enforceable and devoid of purpose16. 
Despite the CC order of 30th November, at the sitting on 2nd of December, 
Sejm unceremoniously selected five new judges, claiming it would prevent the 
previously appointed five from taking office. These were sworn into office by 
President Duda in an after midnight, closed ceremony. PiS delegates argued that 
the previous appointments made by PO contradicted the existing law as well as 
the Polish Constitution.
4. ThE CC jUDGMENT Of ThE 3RD Of DECEMBER 2015, 
CASE K 34/15.
On 3rd of December, in a full bench sitting, the CC gave a strong unanimous 
judgment in case K 34/14 on the unconstitutionality of the Law on the CCA of 
2015. The CC ruled that the election of a judge of the CC carried out, in a sense, 
“in advance” is inadmissible. The dates of the commencement and the end of 
a nine-year term of office are determined individually for every judge, and thus 
16 T. T. Koncewicz, Bruised but not dead (yet):The Polish Constitutional Court has spoken, 
available at: http://verfassungsblog.de/bruised-but-not-dead-yet-the-polish-constitutional-court-
has-spoken-2/.
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particular nominations must be dispersed in time. Consequently, the CC held that 
the October election of three judges by PO was valid, while the appointment of 
the other two, breached the law. These two justices should have been selected by 
the new Sejm. In the judgment the CC also left no doubt that the Constitution 
vested exclusive authority to shape the composition of the CC with Sejm, and it 
is the duty of the President to swear in the justices selected by Sejm17. The CC 
also referred to the procedure of taking the oath from the judges by the President 
emphasising that it is the President’s obligation to take the oath. The fact that 
the law does not set a deadline for this act means that it should be conducted 
immediately18. The CC pointed out that its judgements are binding and final, so 
“as of the moment of the entry into force of this ruling, no state authority has 
a legal basis for challenging – as unconstitutional – those provisions that regulate 
the element of the procedure for electing judges of the CC, which are deemed 
constitutional by the CC in this ruling”19.
however, the judgement of the CC was not published immediately. On 10th 
of December 2015, Minister Beata Kempa, the Chief of the Chancellery of the 
Prime Minister, sent a letter to the President of the CC in which she noted that 
the judgement was invalid, as it had been issued by an inappropriate bench. The 
judgement was issued by a bench composed of five judges, while – in the opin-
ion of the Chief of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister – it should have been 
issued by the full bench. In her letter to the President of the CC, Minister Beata 
Kempa informed the President of the CC that until the matter was clarified she 
would withhold the publication of the judgement20. In a response to the letter, 
the President of the CC, Andrzej Rzepliński, noted that the CC’s judgements 
17 See also: T. T. Koncewicz, Polish Constitutional Drama: Of Courts, Democracy, Con-
stitutional Shenanigans and Constitutional Self-Defense, Int’l j. Const. L. Blog, Dec. 6, 2015, 
at:  http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/12/polish-constitutional-drama-of-courts-democracy-con-
stitutional-shenanigans-and-constitutional-self-defense.
18 “The CC has clearly stated that a delay in the giving of the oath of office may not be 
justified only by an allegation that the legal basis of the judicial election is defective. Indeed, the 
allegation referring to the content of the CCA would have to be transformed into an application to 
determine the conformity to the Constitution of the said Act by the CC.” judgement of the CC of 
3rd December 2015, K 34/15; English fragments of judgement K 34/15 are quoted after the official 
translation on the CC’s website. The translation is available at: http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/hearings/
judgments/art/8748-ustawa-o-trybunale-konstytucyjnym/.
19 judgement of the CC K 34/15, 3rd December 2015.




are final and binding, and their publication is a constitutional duty of the Prime 
Minister21. Eventually, almost two weeks after the judgement’s delivery by the 
CC, it was finally published in the journal of Laws on 16th of December 201522. 
yet it was not until a new ace was ready to come to play – a new amending act 
put forward by PiS on 15th of December 201523. 
On 14th of December 2015, the Regional Prosecutor’s Office in Warsaw ini-
tiated an investigation into the failure by public officials (including the Prime 
Minister) to fulfil their duty to publish the judgement. The Regional Prosecutor’s 
Office had received ten notifications in that case. At the beginning of january 
2016 the investigation was discontinued24.
5. ThE CC jUDGMENT Of ThE 9Th Of DECEMBER 2015, 
CASE K 35/15.
On 9th of December the Court, composed of 5 judges, reviewed the consti-
tutionality of the CAA Amendment of 19th of November (judgment in case K 
35/1525). The case was initiated on the applications submitted by the Polish Om-
budsman, the first President of the Supreme Court, the National Council of the 
judiciary and group of MPs (PO). The applicants challenged selected provisions, 
but also the whole act on account of the manner in which it was adopted. Accord-
ing to the Commissioner for human Rights, National Council of the judiciary of 
Poland and the first President of the Supreme Court, unconstitutionality of the 
legislative process resulted from, among others, the failure to obtain an opinion 
from the National Council of the judiciary of Poland and to consult the draft with 
experts. 
21 Letter of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal, available at: http://trybunal.gov.
pl/fileadmin/content/nie- tylko-dla-mediow/ustawa-kalendarium/Odpowiedz_Prezesa_TK_na_
pismo_o_ogloszeniu_wyroku__K_3_4_15_ADO.pdf.
22 journal of Law, Position no. 2129, available at: http://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/du/2015/2129/1.
23 See also: A. Radwan, op. cit., p. 12.
24 Regional Prosecutor in Warsaw, Information on the discontinuation of proceedings on 
failure to fulfil duties connected to the lack of the publication of the Constitutional Tribunal judge-
ment, available at: http://www.warszawa.po.gov.pl/pl/main/komunikat/id/370/alias/informacja_o_
umorzeniu_sledztwa_w_sprawie_niedopelnienia_ obowiazkow_w_zwiazku_z_zaniechaniem_
publikacji_wyroku_trybunalu_konstytucyjnego.html 
25 English fragments of judgement K 35/15 are quoted after the official translation on the 
Constitutional Tribunal’s website. The translation is available at: http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/hear-
ings/judgments/art/8792-nowelizacja-ustawy-o-trybunale-konstytucyjnym/.
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The challenged CAA Amendment of 19th November annulled the appoint-
ment of the 5 judges made by the old Sejm and paved the way for the selection 
of new ones on 2nd of December26. As mentioned before, the Amendment Act 
introduced a limited term of the President and Vice President of the Court, ap-
plied this change to the current President and Vice-President as well as voided 
their terms of office. It further stipulated that the selection of the judges whose 
term of office expired in 2015 was to take place within 7 days of the entry into 
force of the Amendment Act. The Act also made the appointment conditional 
upon taking the oath before the President. In the judgment of 9th of December 
2015 the CC unanimously declared most of the amendments unconstitutional. 
The CC stated that:
“[t]he CC has no doubts as to the fact that the legislative proceedings were conduc-
ted in breach of the provisions of the Sejm’s Rules of Procedure, and that the scale 
of those breaches was considerable”.27 
The CC quoted in this respect its judgement of 2013 issued by the full bench, in 
which it stated that the first reading of a draft act can take place in a parliamentary 
committee as long as it did not adversely affected the legislative process. In the ana-
lyzed case there were circumstances justifying a departure from the interpretative 
line drawn in 2013. however, considering that the legislative procedure violated the 
Constitution, to do that the CC would have had to rule as a full bench in December 
2015. This, in turn, was not possible because at the beginning of December the CC 
was composed of 10 active judges, including two judges who submitted motions to 
be excluded from ruling on the case (President Andrzej Rzepliński and Vice Presi-
dent Stanisław Biernat). Due to this fact the CC could not rule on the constitutiona-
lity of the legislative procedure of the Amendment Act. 
The CC, as in its judgement of 3rd December 2015, quoted the rule that 
Sejm had the right to choose judges to replace those whose tenures ended within 
the Sejm’s term. Thereby the CC considered Article 137a, introducing a seven-
day deadline for submitting candidates for judges whose tenures expired in 2015, 
as partially unconstitutional. 
The judgement’s publication in the official gazette was again unduly post-
poned by the government, but eventually published in the journal of Laws on 18th 
of December 2015. 




6. ThE AMENDMENT Of ThE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS ACT 
Of 22ND DECEMBER 2015 
On 22nd of December 2015, as a reaction to CC judgments in cases K 34/15 
and K 35/15, Sejm passed another amendment to the CCA (hereinafter: Amend-
ment Act of 22nd December 2015), which introduced a two-third majority and 
the mandatory participation of at least 13, instead of 9, of the 15 judges during 
the full court sitting28. furthermore, according to the Amendment Act of 22nd 
December 2015 pending constitutional proceedings had to wait in the docket for 
six months, and under exceptional circumstances for three months. The CC was 
bound to handle the cases according to the date of receipt. CC judges might be 
dismissed on request of Sejm, the President or the Department of justice. The 
amended procedural rules should also apply to already pending cases (under 
certain circumstances) and the statute became effective on the day of its publica-
tion (no vacatio legis). The President and the Minister of justice were granted 
the competence to file applications for disciplinary proceedings against Tribunal 
judges. Both of them (as well as Sejm) were given a role in the procedure leading 
to the expiration of the term of the office of Tribunal judges. Dates of court hear-
ings were to be set in the sequence of submitted applications, irrespective of their 
constitutional urgency or significance, and the earliest three/six months after the 
parties had been notified of the applications.
The bill was approved by Senat (the second chamber of the Polish parlia-
ment) on 24th of December 2015 after an overnight session, and signed by Presi-
dent Andrzej Duda on 28th of December 2015. The Act was challenged to the 
CC by the first President of the Supreme Court, two groups of Sejm Deputies 
(PO and Nowoczesna), the Polish Ombudsman, and the National Council of the 
judiciary of Poland. Applicants criticized the Act for removing important checks 
on the government’s power and paralysing the CC. In a leaked draft report, legal 
experts from the Council of Europe rights watchdog – The European Commis-
sion for Democracy through Law (the so-called Venice Commission29) warned 
28 The regulation was introduced despite very clear constitutional provision which stipulates 
that “judgments of the CC shall be made by a majority of votes”. 
29 The so-called Venice Commission is an advisory body of the Council of Europe composed 
of experts on constitutional law. As part of its activity, the Commission delivers opinions on draft 
acts and acts adopted in the countries of the Council of Europe, in particular in countries under 
transformation. Multiple times, the Commission has presented its opinions, among others, on mat-
ters concerning particular countries (e.g. Ukraine and hungary), but also on specific issues (e.g. 
the oversight of secret services).The Venice Commission can issue opinions, among others, upon 
a motion of a member of the Council of Europe. 
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that the reforms undermined democracy, human rights as well as the rule of law 
in Poland30.
7. ThE CC DECISION Of 7Th jANUARy 2016 U 8/15
At the beginning of December 2015, a group of MPs from PO challenged 
the constitutionality of the Sejm’s resolutions passed in November and Decem-
ber 2015. The group questioned both those resolutions which invalidated the 
previous resolutions of October 2015 on the appointment of five judges of the 
CC (November 2015) and those which appointed new judges (December 2015).
The CC considered this motion at a closed hearing in january 2016, and 
decided to discontinue the proceedings. The decision was passed by a  bench 
composed of 10 judges. The CC decided that the resolutions invalidating the 
resolution of October 2015 were not normative acts, and therefore could not be 
reviewed by the CC. When it comes to the December resolutions appointing five 
new judges, the CC held that they did not fulfill the criteria of a normative act 
either, as they are “a category of not law-making resolutions through which Sejm 
would exercise its creative function in relation to public authority bodies”. 
The CC emphasised:
“[...] in the spirit of responsibility for the state’s constitutional order, respecting the 
principle of cooperation of powers set forth in the preamble to the Constitution, and 
protecting constitutional values, [the Constitutional Tribunal – author’s note] has 
made attempts to cooperate with the legislative and executive powers, especially 
with the President, becoming a party to the dialogue in an effort to find a constitu-
tional solution of disputed matters […] So far, it has not brought the desired results. 
On the contrary, one has the impression that it has escalated the actions whose aim 
is to limit the Tribunal’s capacity to perform the function vested in it by the consti-
tutional legislator”31. 
30 At the beginning of December 2015, a  group of non-governmental organisations, sent 
a letter to the Venice Commission in which it noted the changes that had been introduced with 
respect to the CC. Since non-governmental organisations do not have a mandate to motion for such 
an opinion, the President of the Commission Gianni Buquicchio informed them that the Commis-
sion, “is monitoring the events in Poland with attention and concern”. After Senat adopted the 
Amendment Act of 22nd December 2015, the Minister of foreign Affairs requested the Venice 
Commission to prepare an opinion on the Amendment Act available at: https://www.msz.gov.pl/
pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/minister_waszczykowski_wystapil_o_opinie_w_sprawie_trybunalu_ 
konstytucyjnego_do_komisji_weneckiej.
31 Decision of the CC of 7th january 2016, U 8/15.
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As a result of this decision and on the basis of judgements passed in De-
cember 2015, the President of the CC, Andrzej Rzepliński, assigned judges Piotr 
Pszczółkowski and julia Przyłębska, chosen to replace those judges whose terms 
of office expired in December 2015, to adjudicate cases. from then on, there 
have been 12 adjudicating judges in the CC32.
8. ThE CC jUDGMENT Of 9Th MARCh 2016, CASE K 47/15. 
A day after the Amendment Act of 22nd December 2015 entered into force, 
a motion to review its constitutionality was filed with the CC by the first Presi-
dent of the Supreme Court. A couple of days later, motions were also filed by the 
Commissioner for human Rights, National Council of the judiciary of Poland 
and two groups of MPs. Amicus curiae briefs were submitted in the proceedings 
by the Polish Bar Council, National Council of Attorneys at law, hfhR and the 
Stefan Batory foundation. All applicants motioned for the whole Amendment 
Act to be pronounced as unconstitutional. Additionally, the first President of 
the Supreme Court, National Council of the judiciary of Poland, and a group of 
MPs motioned for the case to be considered under the ACC of 2015 in the word-
ing from before the amendment. The CC considered the case on the basis of the 
Constitution and those provisions of the CCA 2015 which were not challenged. 
At the hearing on 8th of March 2016, the CC examined the motions as 
a bench composed of 12 judges. None of the government’s representatives ap-
peared at the hearing. 
On 9th of March 2016, the CC reached probably the most important, and 
most extraordinary in its substance, verdict since its establishment thirty years 
ago (judgment in the case K 47/15)33. The CC decided that the whole Amendment 
Act of 22nd December 2015 was non-compliant with constitutional provisions 
regarding parliamentary legislation procedure. The legislative process which 
culminated in the adoption of Amendment Act of 22nd  December  2015 evi-
denced that Sejm deliberately disregarded constitutional standards: the amend-
32 See also: The constitutional crisis in Poland 2015–2016. Report of the Helsinki Founda-
tion of Human Rights, available at: http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/hfhR_The-
constitutional-crisis-in-Poland-2015-2016.pdf, pp. 31–32.
33 however, as P. Starski points out, the CC judgment’s strength was overshadowed by the 
fact that it was leaked a day before its announcement, P. Starski, The Power of the Rule of Law: 
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s Forceful Reaction, available at: http://verfassungsblog.de/
the-power-of-the-rule-of-law-the-polish-constitutional-tribunals-forceful-reaction/, DOI: https://
dx.doi.org/10.17176/20160317-165259.
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ment had undergone only two readings instead of three within Sejm, members 
of parliament had not had sufficient time to analyze the amendment draft which 
touched upon constitutionally highly significant matters before its first and sec-
ond reading, the draft had been modified too extensively between the first and the 
second reading, thereby violating the rules on legislative initiative, and addition-
ally consultations with external bodies had been omitted34. 
The CC struck down also many sections of the Act as they prevented the 
honest and proper functioning of the CC, by interfering in its independence and 
separation from other powers, thus violating the principles of the rule of law. 
The CC held that the parliament failed to put forward weighty reasons for 
setting the principle of vacatio legis aside and stipulating that the Amendment 
Act of 22nd December 2015 became effective on the day of its promulgation. The 
Amendment Act of 22nd December 2015 limited the CC’s competence of consti-
tutional review. Procedural changes introduced by the Act, even taken separately, 
would lead to a  considerable slowdown in the CC’s decision-making process 
and in their combination ultimately to a paralysis of the CC, which violated in 
a decidedly arbitrary manner judicial independence, the separation of powers 
and the right to a fair trial. The CC pointed out particularly that the sequence 
rule would lead to the effect that procedures initiated after the day the amend-
ment had become effective (28th December 2015) could only be adjudicated after 
174 previously submitted cases would be closed. The CC was very explicit in 
unraveling the true motives behind the Amendment Act, which was to make it de 
facto impossible to submit legislation adopted during the ongoing parliamentary 
session to an effective and prompt constitutional review. The CC pointed out 
that statutory provisions which installed the participation of other organs in the 
initiation of disciplinary proceedings against judges of the CC infringed the core 
of judicial independence and were incompatible with the separation of powers. 
The same applied to the engagement of the President, the Minister of justice as 
well as Sejm in the proceedings leading to the termination of a CC judge’s term 
of office.
The CC decided that the object of the review (the CAA of 2015 as amended 
by the Amendment Act of 22nd December 2015) could not be at the same time its 
34 The CC emphasised that: “…the legislative process – as a set of constitutional and lower-
level rules determining the manner for adopting acts – has to fulfil two basic tasks – provide an act 
with a democratic mandate and give it substantive legitimacy. The violations indicated by the CC 
which had taken place in the process of adopting the amending act justify a claim that in the case 
at hand, it did not fulfil any of those tasks”. judgement of the CC of 9th March 2016, K 47/15. See 
also: P. Starski, op. cit.
Aleksandra Kustra356
very basis. hence, the CC did not obey the amended procedural rules in render-
ing its judgment thereby reinstating the supremacy of the constitution over ordi-
nary legislative acts. Taking the factual circumstances into account the 12 judges, 
who had signed the judgment, constituted the CC’s “full bench” irrespective of 
the fact that the constitution stipulates that the CC is composed of 15 judges. 
Only these 12 judges had been constitutionally appointed and sworn in, and were 
hence competent to adjudicate35. Dissenting opinions to the judgment were sub-
mitted by two “December judges”, julia Przyłębska and Piotr Pszczółkowski. 
Nevertheless they signed it. 
Since the Amendment Act of the 22nd December 2015 introduced a “double 
2/3 requirement”, which meant that the CC was only competent to render judg-
ments with a 2/3 majority if 2/3 of its members were present, Prime Minister 
Beata Szydło as well as the Minister of justice zbigniew ziobro regarded the CC 
judgment as a mere „communiqué“ of an informal meeting of judges lacking any 
binding effect. According to the government, the CC disrespected the procedural 
requirements established by the amended act and refused to publish the judg-
ment in the law gazette, which is a prerequisite for the voidness of the provisions 
declared unconstitutional. As such course of events was easy to predict, the CC 
had anticipated this move and addressed it clearly in its judgment. It stressed the 
finality and binding nature of its judgment after its announcement in the court 
room, and the lack of any other bodies competent to question it. The CC declared 
to be bound by its judgment as well all courts to be obliged not to apply the an-
nulled rules36. In effect, the provisions of the ACC of 2015 in the wording from 
before the Amendment Act of 22nd December 2015 were restored. 
The representatives of the government and the governing majority did not 
accept this judgement37. The Minister of justice, who thanks to recent legislation 
simultaneously serves as the General Prosecutor, announced that he “has recom-
35 Ibidem.
36 Ibidem.
37 Minister of justice zbigniew ziobro stated that: “In this particular case, fortunately, we 
do not have to do with a judgement, with a ruling and a lawful action. This meeting of judges in 
the CC was not a meeting of the constitutional court, but a meeting of judges who inaptly tried 
to deliver a ruling which they could not have passed, since they acted in violation of the Act on 
the CC, which governs the functioning of the CC, and in violation of the Constitution.”; Rzeczpo-
spolita, z. ziobro: Dzisiejsze orzeczenie TK nie ma mocy prawnej, available at: http://www.rp.pl/
Sedziowie-i-sady/303099902-ziobro-dzisiejsze-orzeczenie-TK-nie-ma-mocy-prawnej.html; see 
also: helsinki foundation for human Rights’ Report: Constitutional crisis in Poland, 2015-2016, 
available at: http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/hfhR_The-constitutional-crisis-in-
Poland-2015-2016.pdf.
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mended” the competent regional prosecutor to investigate possible felonies in-
volved in this matter38. This statement, however, shows inconsistency in the gov-
ernment’s position regarding the judgment. (Was it a mere „communiqué“ of an 
informal meeting of judges lacking any binding effect or the CC’s judgment?)39. 
Prime Minister Beata Szydło, in turn, even before the judgement was delivered 
had said that she would not be able to publish it. In her opinion, publishing a de-
cision which is not a judgement of the CC would violate the Constitution40. 
In March 2016, Warsaw prosecution registered 100 notifications on a po-
tential crime, which consisted in not publishing the judgement of the CC of 9th 
March 2016, perpetrated by government officials. however, at the end of April, 
the Regional Prosecutor’s Office for Warsaw–Praga refused to initiate pre-trial 
proceedings in the case, claiming that, “the verification proceedings did not re-
veal any signs of failure to fulfil duties by the Prime Minister, Minister-Member 
of the Council of Ministers and the President, as well as employees of the Gov-
ernmental Centre of Legislation”41. 
Despite the lack of publication of the judgment, the CC has functioned since 
March 2016, on the basis of the ACC of june 2015. It returned to adjudicating. 
Between March and August 2016, the CC passed more than 20 judgments, none 
of which had been published until August 201642.
38 A day before the hearing, the Deputy Minister of justice stated in an interview that the 
delivered judgement will not be binding. “Tomorrow, this will not be a hearing of the CC, but 
a gathering of people who sit in the CC at best. from the institutional point of view, tomorrow’s 
events, if they take place, will be an absolute scandal […]. The judges of the CC are free people. 
They can meet when they want to, they can order espresso and cookies, and they can meet. We 
are not able to use any coercive measures, but we appeal and we ask. Do not destroy the Polish 
state”. Deputy Minister of justice Patryk jaki, Radio zet, 7th March 2016; available at: http://www.
radiozet.pl/Radio/Programy/Gosc-Radia-zET/Artykuly/Patryk-jaki-u-Moniki-Olejnik-00019704; 
see also: helsinki foundation for human Rights’ Report.
39 P. Starski, The Power of the Rule of Law: The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s Forceful 
Reaction, available at: http://verfassungsblog.de/the-power-of-the-rule-of-law-the-polish-constitu-
tional-tribunals-forceful-reaction/, DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20160317-165259.
40 Rzeczpospolita, Wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z  9 marca ws. nowelizacji ustawy 
o  TK autorstwa PiS, available at: http://www.rp.pl/Sedziowie-i-sady/303099926-Wyrok-Trybu-
nalu-Konstytucyjnego-z-9-marca-ws-nowelizacji-ustawy-o-TK-autorstwa-PiS.html, see also: hel-
sinki foundation for human Rights’.
41 Polskie Radio, jest decyzja prokuratury w sprawie nieopublikowania wyroku TK, avail-
able at: http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1612924,jest-decyzja-prokuratury-w-sprawie-
nieopublikowania-wyroku-TK, see also: helsinki foundation for human Rights’ Report.
42 helsinki foundation for human Rights’ Report, p. 34.
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After the CC’s judgement of 9th March 2016, there appeared a risk that two 
separate legal systems would emerge. On the one hand, governmental adminis-
tration did not acknowledge the judgement of the CC. On the other hand, the CC 
started working again and began to issue judgements in other cases43.
In response to this threat the General Assembly of judges of the Supreme 
Court adopted a resolution at the end of April, in which it stated:
“an unpublished judgement of the CC finding an act unconstitutional revokes the 
act’s presumption of constitutionality at the moment when the Tribunal announces 
its judgement”44. 
The Supreme Court’s resolution was met with a harsh reaction from the rep-
resentatives of the governing majority. The spokesperson of the PiS parliamenta-
ry club Beata Mazurek described the Supreme Court’s resolution as adopted by, 
“a bunch of buddies who protect the status quo of the former government”45. The 
opposition MPs filed a complaint in relation to this statement with the Sejm’s 
Ethics Committee, which punished the MP with a reprimand46. 
A similar resolution was passed by the Collegium of the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court a day after the adoption of the resolution by the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Administrative Court’s judges called for:
“respect for the independence of judges and the CC, which in a democratic state 
ruled by law, such as Poland, are a branch of power separate and independent of 
other powers and guarding the rights and freedoms of citizens”47. 
43 Ibidem, p. 50
44 Supreme Court, Uchwała zgromadzenia Ogólnego Sędziów Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 26 
kwietnia 2016 r., available at: http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SiteAssets/Lists/Wydarzenia/Editform/
Uchwala_zgr_Og_SSN_26_04_2016.pdf; see also: helsinki foundation for human Rights’ Report.
45 TVN24, “zebrał się zespół kolesi”. Rzecznik PiS o  Sądzie Najwyższym, available at: 
http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/rzecznik-pis-beata-mazurek-o-sadzie-najwyzszym-
zespol-kolesi,639007.html; see also: helsinki foundation for human Rights’ Report: Constitu-
tional crisis in Poland, 2015-2016, available at: http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/
hfhR_The-constitutional-crisis-in-Poland-2015-2016.pdf.
46 Onet.pl, Beata Mazurek ukarana za słowa o  “zespole kolesi”, dostępne na: http://wi-
adomosci.onet.pl/kraj/beata-mazurek-ukarana-za-slowa-o-zespole-kolesi/r9ed4y; see also: hel-
sinki foundation for human Rights’ Report: Constitutional crisis in Poland, 2015-2016, avail-
able at: http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/hfhR_The-constitutional-crisis-in-Po-
land-2015-2016.pdf. 
47 Supreme Administrative Court, Uchwała Kolegium Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego 
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Supreme Court recognized also the possibility to shield the constitutional 
order from being further weakened and disassembled through emergency decen-
tralized constitutional review whereby regular courts would review the consti-
tutionality of laws48. In a judgment on 17th of March 2016, the Supreme Court 
declared a tax law provision unconstitutional without referring the question to the 
CC, as is commonly the case49. Although such a solution deviates from the core 
of the centralized judicial review system established in the Polish constitution, 
it might be legitimized as “constitutional self-defense” in light of the systemic 
dysfunction of the CC. The Supreme Court, while clearly recognizing the CC’s 
prerogative to deal with the matter, argued in the above mentioned judgment, that 
the ongoing constitutional crisis could not be neglected. Nevertheless, the case 
was rather specific, as the non-applied statutory provision was similar to a one 
invalidated in an earlier case by the CC as unconstitutional. Another important 
issue which should be reminded while considering the option of emergency con-
stitutional review is the fact, that innovative judgments of the Supreme Court only 
bind the parties to a case, whereas the CC’s rulings have general application50.
9. ThE OPINION Of ThE VENICE COMMISSION Of 11Th MARCh 2016
The delegation of the Venice Commission visited Poland at the beginning 
of february 2016. At the beginning of March Venice Commission`s opinion was 
published51. According to the Commission, blocking the work of the CC con-
stitutes a threat to the principle of the rule of law, democracy and protection of 
human rights. The Commission was critical of the solutions introduced in the 
Amendment Act of 22nd December 2015, and pointed out that they could slow 
down or even paralyze the CC’s work. This, in turn, would be unacceptable in the 
light of European standards. 
z  dnia 27 kwietnia 2016 r., available at: http://www.nsa.gov.pl/komunikaty/uchwala-kolegium-
naczelnego-sadu-administracyjnego-z-dnia-27-kwietnia-2016-r,news,4,309.php; see also: hel-
sinki foundation for human Rights’ Report: Constitutional crisis in Poland, 2015-2016, avail-
able at: http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/hfhR_The-constitutional-crisis-in-Po-
land-2015-2016.pdf.
48 See also: T. T. Koncewicz, ‘Emergency Constitutional review’: thinking the unthinkable. 
A  letter from America, available at: http://verfassungsblog.de/emergency-constitutional-review-
thinking-the-unthinkable-a-letter-from-america/.
49 P. Starski, op. cit.
50 Ibidem.
51 It happened in an atmosphere of controversy caused by the publication of the draft of the 
opinion.
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A part of the opinion was also devoted to the manner of electing judges of 
the CC. In this regard the Commission held:
“As the composition of Parliament changes after elections, the new Parliament must 
not be deprived of its power to take its own decisions on issues that arise during 
its mandate. It would be in conflict with democratic principles if Parliament could 
choose public officials including judges (far) in advance even if the term of office 
expires within the term of office of the subsequent term of Parliament. Vice versa, 
the subsequent Parliament has to respect the decisions of the former Parliament with 
regard to appointments of public officials”52. 
The Commission emphasised also that the refusal to publish the CC judge-
ment of 9th March 2016 would not only be contrary to the rule of law, but it would 
also lead to, “an unprecedented deepening of the constitutional crisis”53. In this 
respect The Venice Commission stated that, “not only the rule of law but also the 
European Constitutional heritage require the respect and effective implementation 
of decisions of constitutional courts”, and therefore it called upon all “the state or-
gans and notably Sejm to fully respect and implement the judgments of the CC”54. 
10. ThE NEW ACT ON CC Of 22ND jULy 2016
On 3rd of june 2016, the parliamentary works on three drafts of the new act 
on the CC were initiated55. After they had been referred to the justice and human 
Rights Committee of Sejm, all three drafts were transferred to the subcommittee 
52 Venice Commission, Opinion on amendments to the Act of 25th june 2015 on the Con-
stitutional Tribunal of Poland, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session 
(Venice, 11–12 March 2016), available at: www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
AD(2016)001-e. See also: helsinki foundation for human Rights’ Report: Constitutional crisis 




55 Together with a draft submitted by the Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, 
abbreviated to PSL) and a citizen initiative were initiated. The choice of this date could have been 
motivated by the development of events in relation to the Rule of Law framework initiated by 
the European Commission (see further Reactions to the constitutional crisis – international com-
munity, p. 42).On 29th of April 2016 a group of MPs from PiS Party submitted to Sejm a draft of 
a new act on the CC. 
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set up specifically for the purpose of selecting the leading draft. The subcommit-
tee decided that the PiS’s draft act, would be the leading document. The selected 
draft raised numerous concerns of constitutional nature. Despite all these reser-
vations, PiS had rushed it through the parliament, having MPs to work day and 
night, ahead of the NATO summit in Warsaw in early july.
The new Act on the CC was eventually adopted on 22nd of july 201656. The 
following points were the most important elements of the new ACC of 22nd july 
2016:
– The immediate taking up of their duties by all judges who took the oath 
before the President.
– Consideration of cases in the sequence in which they were filed, unless 
the President of the CC decides otherwise.
– The necessity to defer the hearing in a full bench in case of the absence 
of the Prosecutor General.
– The necessity to defer deliberations on the judgement even by six months 
in a case when an objection is raised as to the content of the judgement 
by at least four judges.
– The publication of CC’s judgement upon a motion of the President of the 
CC filed with the Prime Minister.
– The exclusion of the judgement of 9th of March 2016 from the publica-
tion.
– Transitional provisions which would slow down consideration of cases 
before the CC.
– The imposition on the CC of an obligation to finalise all cases within one 
year of the act entering into force.
– The necessity to suspend the proceedings for six months in a case when 
the initiating document does not fulfil formal criteria.
– The necessity to apply the new act to all proceedings before the CC.
– Only a 14-day-long vacatio legis57.
11. ThE jUDGMENT Of ThE 11Th AUGUST 2016
The new ACC of 22nd july 2016 was challenged before the CC by two groups 
of MPs just a day after its publication in the journal of Laws. A couple of days 
56 The President signed the ACC of 22nd july 2016 on 30th of july 2016 and it was published 
in the journal of Laws on 1st of August 2016.
57 See: helsinki foundation for human Rights’ Report…, p. 40.
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later, a similar motion was filed by the first President of the Supreme Court. The 
applicants motioned for the review of the whole ACC of 22nd july 2016, but they 
also formed charges against particular provisions.
On 11th of August 2016 (after a closed hearing) the CC ruled that the ACC 
of july 2016 was partially not compliant with the Constitution (judgment of 11th 
of August 2016, case K 39/16). Among others the CC considered as unconstitu-
tional: the obligation imposed on the President of the CC to assign cases to three 
judges chosen for posts which had already been filled; the introduction of provi-
sions allowing selective publication of CC’s judgements, excluding publication 
of the judgement of 9th March 2016; the introduction of the procedure whereby 
the President of the CC motions the Prime Minister to publish judgements, and 
the necessity to defer the trial due to the absence of a properly notified Prosecutor 
General. The CC also deemed as unconstitutional the provisions on considering 
cases in the sequence in which they were filed and on the obligation to consider 
cases in a full bench upon a motion of at least three judges. 
At the same time, the CC discontinued the proceedings with respect to the 
procedure of electing the President of the CC by the President from among three 
candidates submitted by the General Assembly of judges of the CC. The review 
of their constitutionality was impossible, since the charges in this respect were 
formulated too narrowly and did not include all the relevant provisions. 
“Not even a  democratically elected parliament has the right to set regu-
lations that conflict with the fundamental law”, the judge-rapporteur, Andrzej 
Wróbel, announced when presenting the verdict. he added that the Polish consti-
tution of 1997 determines the division of powers between different institutions in 
the country and must be respected.
Dissenting opinions to the judgment were submitted by the following judg-
es of the  Constitutional Tribunal: judge zbigniew jędrzejewski58, judge julia 
Przyłębska, and judge Piotr Pszczółkowski.
As a result of the CC judgment of 11th of August 2016, the ACC of june 
2015 lost its binding force with the entry into force of the ACC of july 2016. 
however, the CC’s consideration of practically all of the transitional provisions 
as unconstitutional may cause significant problems in applying the law. Moreo-
ver, jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of PiS dismissed the judgment as “political” 
and “an act of private nature” already in the eve of its rendering, adding that the 
58 On 29th of March 2016, the government nominated its own candidate, zbigniew 
jędrzejewski, to replace CC judge Mirosław Granat whose term expired in April 2016. Opposition 
parties have not nominated their candidates.
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government would not respect it and, as it was easy to predict, the government 
refused to publish it. 
12. ThE CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES.
The ongoing constitutional crisis in Poland is far more than yet just another 
example of “court packing” agenda59. It rather resembles the hungarian case, 
where the Orbán’s fidesz has “successfully” marginalised the role of the hungar-
ian Constitutional Court. however, unlike in hungary, PiS did not win in demo-
cratic elections the supermajority needed to amend the Constitution of 1997. As 
A. Radwan points out, in spite of that fact, Kaczyński’s party now attempts to get 
there through dubious by-passes trampling the rule of law and spoiling political 
and constitutional culture. But it is still more complex than just to say that the 
incumbents strive for the marginalisation of the CC. It equally appears to make 
a part of an attempted redefinition of elites and societal structure of post-socialist 
Poland, as defined by the renowned Round Table Talks and accompanying nego-
tiations that led to a bloodless transformation started in 198960. The Polish case 
illustrates that even seemingly well-established constitutional courts may get into 
serious trouble once the generalized support to the idea of limited government 
and the separation of powers, and finally the principle of judicial review, is di-
59 The term was originally used in reference to 1937 plan prepared by Roosevelt adminis-
tration to increase the number of Supreme Court judges from 9 to 15 (allegedly to make it more 
efficient). After the plan was announced, the Supreme Court changed its tune and became more 
amenable to upholding economic regulations. In March of 1937, the Court decided West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish and before minimum wage legislation was about to be struck down, one con-
servative justice switched position and voted to uphold the law in question, in a change of direction 
that was called the “switch in time that saved nine”. After this and several similar decisions, Con-
gressional support for Roosevelt’s packing plan collapsed. Eventually, in cases like United States 
v. Carolene Products Company,  the U.S. Supreme Court gave legislators the ability to impose 
economic regulations, and SCOTUS scrutiny of such matters grew more minimal. Nevertheless, 
Roosevelt’s court packing plan is badly remembered as a proposal that threatened the indepen-
dence of the judiciary, a  threat that proved successful. See further on this issue: B. A. Perry, 
h. j. Abraham, Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court. A New Deal and a New Image, in: 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of the Supreme Court, eds. S.K. Shaw, W.D. Peder-
son, M.R Williams, Routledge 2015. however, an older illustration of “court packing” agenda were 
“midnight appointments” made by President john Adams on his last day in office which led to the 
pivotal Marbury v. Madison judgment of the Supreme Court in 1801. 
60 A. Radwan, op. cit., p. 16
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minishing61. for the first time Sejm annulled a valid election of judges; for the 
first time, the Polish government has openly ignored a clear command of the CC 
(judgments 3rd and 9th December 2015) and the government has called a binding 
CC judgment a mere communiqué (judgment of 9th March)62. 
Moreover, Poland has become the subject of the EU Rule of Law frame-
work which allows the European Council to impose sanctions on countries found 
to be in serious and persistent breach of fundamental EU values (Article 2 of 
TfUE). In the worst-case scenario it means suspending voting rights of the 
Member Country. In january 2015, the European Commission decided to un-
dertake a preliminary investigation of whether there were clear indications of 
a ‘systemic threat to the rule of law’ and initiate a dialogue with the member 
state concerned. In response, the Polish government strongly opposed Commis-
sion interference and insisted that it was an internal matter of a political rather 
than legal nature. however, it also tried to de-escalate the dispute by saying that 
it was open to dialogue with the Commission and consultations with opposition 
leaders to find a compromise solution. On 27th of july 2016, the Commission 
moved to the next stage of the procedure issuing an official ‘rule of law recom-
mendation’ urging the Polish government to: swear in the judges elected by the 
previous parliament; publish and fully implement all tribunal rulings; screen the 
latest tribunal law for compliance with the Venice Commission; and report on 
progress within three months63. The Commission, however, has no powers to 
impose sanctions on Poland as the ‘rule of law’ framework only constitutes a po-
litical dialogue without any legally binding recommendations. These can only 
arise if the Commission proposes them to the EU Council under Article 7 TfUE, 
where they require unanimity in one of the three stages of voting. It is worth 
mentioning that the hungarian government has already made it clear that it will 
veto any attempt to introduce such measures64.
The ongoing crisis triggers debate on further perspectives of the CC. Cur-
rently the government appears to be employing delaying tactics and waiting 
till December 2016 when the term of the current President of the CC, Andrzej 
61 A. śledzińska-Simon, op. cit.
62 P. Starski, op. cit.
63 Further on this issue see: A. Sczerbiak, Is there an end in sight to Poland’s constitutio-
nal  crisis? https://polishpoliticsblog.wordpress.com/2016/08/02/is-there-an-end-in-sight-to-po-
lands-constitutional-crisis/.
64 See A. Sczerbiak, How Will The EU’s ‘Rule Of Law’ Investigation Affect Polish Politics? 
https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/02/how-will-the-eus-rule-of-law-investigation-affect-polish-
politics/.
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Rzepliński, ends65. One can only wait for the Government’s showdown regarding 
this matter. Undoubtedly PiS will attempt to impact on the selection procedure, 
which is a part of the CC General Assembly competence. 
No matter how the Polish constitutional crisis will develop one thing is 
certain- it has proved the accuracy of A. hamilton’s assessment of the judicial 
branch’s position within the tri-partite division of powers, when he claimed that:
“Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must per-
ceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the ju-
diciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the 
political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy 
or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword 
of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes 
the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The 
judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no 
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no ac-
tive resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither fORCE nor WILL, 
but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive 
arm even for the efficacy of its judgments”66.
As Kim L. Scheppele points out, the separation of power is a contact sport67. 
In times of tension between a constitutional court and a parliament or a govern-
ment, the former has merely judgments to defend its position. Although courts 
have powerful weapon, judicial activism, the Polish case shows that sometimes 
it is simply not enough. 
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